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IMPROVING PUBLIC ENTERPRISE PERFORMANCE: LESSONS FROM SOUTH KOREA
Overvie
1. In 1983 Korea dramatically changed the way it managed the largest and
most important group of its public enterprises, the Government Invested
Enterprises, or GIEs. The reforms increased enterprise autonomy, changed
managerial selection procedures, and began systematically to evaluate
performance and provide incentives on the basis of the evaluation. This paper
assesses the results of these reforms, and suggests ways the Korean
performance evaluation system might be adapted to circumstances in other
countries.
2. The impact of the reforms on operational efficiency can be measured for
five of the GIEs, including two of the most important enterprises in the
economy: the Korean Power Corporation (KEPCO) and the Korean
Telecommunication Authority (KTA). This group of enterprises shows a sharp
improvement in efficiency in the period after the reforms, well above their
past trends in performance. While this paper was unable to attribute the
efficiency gains conclusively to the reforms, there is strong qualitative
evidence that the changes were an important reason for the operational
improvements.
1/Thia paper was prepared with extensive assistance from Dr. Song, Dae Hee,
Korea Development Institute, and Mari Ilzuka, World Bank.
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3. A central feature of the Korean reforms is the performance evaluation
system, which sets clear targets for management and provides bonuses on the
basis of outcomes. The Korean system is similar to one operating in Pakistan,
and both are based on systems used in large private companies to manage their
subsidiaries, which should make the system readily easily to adapt to other
country circumstances. As the paper points out, the system has four essential
prerequisites for success: (i) parallel reforms to increase managerial
autonomy and skills; (if) reliable and timely information; (iii) adequate
skills to supervise and evaluate; and, (iv) political will. The paper
suggests ways to build up and compensate for the first three requirements;
there is no substitute for the last.
The Korean Public Enter2rise Sectot
4. Although the Korean public enterprise (PE) sector is relatively large,
consisting of 90 enterprises which produce about 10.4% of GDP, the character
has been changing (see Graph 1). Manufacturing, which was responsible for
almost 47% of PE value added in 1975 and 38% in 1980, is now only about 16%.
Financial services, another large sector in the past, dropped from 19% in 1980
to about 11% today. In contrast, electricity, gas, transport and
communications have grown to 60% of PE value added. These shifts mean that
the PE sector now largely provides supporting services to the private sector
rather than acting as a competitor or substitute.
5. Furthermore, the PE sectors importance as an investor has been
declining. In 1987 PEs were responsible for 15.6% of gross fixed capital
formation, down from close to 48% in 1982 (see Graph 2). The sector has never
-3-
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been a large employer: it is respcisible for less than 2% of total
employment.
6. The PEs are divided into four main categories:
(i) Twenty six Government Invested Enterprises (GIEs),
which are a diverse group of incorporated companies and
include 5 financial companies, 8 promotional and 13
productive firms; this group is by far the largest in
terms of value added (60%), employment (49%),
investment (81%), and assets (57%) (see Graph 3 and
Annex Table C);
(ii) Four government enterprises (GEs), which are, in
effect, government departments and include the railway,
the post office (Ministry of Communication), the Office
of Supply (a central procurement agency), and the
Office of Grain Management (price support);
(iii) Fifty-four Subsidiary Companies of the GIEs (SCGIEs),
which include a large shipbuilding and heavy industry
contractcr as well as smaller equipment, financial,
tourism, consulting, and service companies; and,
(iv) Six Government Backed Enterprises (GBEs) where
government owns less than 50% of the shares, which
- 6 -
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include two large banks (Korean Exchange Bank and Ex-
Im-Bank) and the Po-Hang Iron and Steel company and
three smaller firms.2/
7. These four groups are treated very differently by government. The
treatment of the GIEs is the subject of the rest of this report. As for the
rest, the GEs are virtually a part of the Central Government with minimal
autonomy. The main avenue of reform for a GE is to incorporate as a GIE, and
GEs must improve their performance to merit such a change. The
Telecommunications Authority moved from GE to GIE ir, 1982; the Office of the
Monopoly in 1987; and the Railway (KNR) will become a GIE in 1991. (The
remaining three GEs -- Post Office, the Office of Supply (central procurement)
and the Office of Grain Management (price stabilization) -- are unlikely to be
incorporated in the near term). The management of KNR expects that the move
to GIE will give them more freedom to close uneconomic lines, to introduce
less bureaucratic personnel management, to diversify services (travel agent
services, for example), and to price more flexibly.
8. The SCGIEs may be true subsidiaries, created by the parent GIE in a
related field to carry out some speciLlized task (such as the Korean Telephone
Directory or the Harbor Telephone). Some SCGIEs, however, are companies
apparently kept alive by Government for social or political reasons. In these
cases the "parent" company has been required by government to acquire the
shares of its "subsidiary" (this appears to be the case with the electricity
2/For a list of the companies in each group by asset size see Table C of
the statistical appendix at the end of this annex.
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company's purchase of shares in the Heavy Industry Company, for example).
Often the SCGIE receives support from the GIE in the form of low interest
loans or implicit subsidies (for oxample, the electricity company 4q required
to treat Heavy Industry as its sole supplier for its products). There are no
centralized data on these firms, most of which are relatively small. One
exception is the Dae Woo Shipbuilding Company which represents 28% of th.
SCGIE assets and is the sixth largest PE in Korea (in terms of 1986 salt And
employment). It made losses amounting to 20% of equity in 1986 and had a
debt/equity ratio of 6.9.
9. Finally, the GBEs operate with considerable autonomy. Usually the
private sector has a majority shareholding, and government does not have a
seat on the board. An excepcion is Po Hang Steel which is in fact 100%
public: government holds a minority share directly, but also owns the
remaining shares through a publicly owned bank. Nevertheless, Po Hang Steel
has been given Lhe same independence as the GBEs with majority private
shareholding.
The 1983 Reform Program for Government Invested Enterprises
10. There are financial, promotic:.l and business GIEs (see Table 1),
the later category including some very large firms (such as the electricity
company, or the telecommunications authority). Most of the promotional GIEs
receive regular subsidies to cover the costs of their noncommercial
activities. Nevertheless, they have been generally expected to perform
efficiently and the subsidies are, in effect, government payment for a
Table 1
KOREA: GlEt BY CATEGORIES
Financial GlEs Promotioaal GlEs /1 Business GIEI
Korea Development Bank Korea Nining Promwtion Corp. Korea Electric Power Corp.
Sma(l & Medium Industry Bank Petroleum Developmient Corp. Korea Telecom. Authority
Citizens National Bank Korea Trade Promtion Corp. Goverrment Hint
Korea Housing Bank Agri. Promtion Corp. Korea Housing Corp.
Korea Securities Exchange Agri. & Fishery Mktg. Corp. 12 Industry Sites & Water Resource Dev. Corp.
Korea Tourism Corp. /2 Korea Land Development Corp.
Overseas Development Corp. /2 Korea Gas Corp.
Labor Welfare Corp. /2 Korea Highway Corp.
Korea Coal Corp.
Korea Broadcasting System
Korea Integrated Chemical Stock Coqp.
National Textbook Comp.
Korea Monopoly Corp.
Source: Korea Development Iristitution
Notes: /1 Defined as GIEs whose main objective is promotional. Some also have busiress activities.
/2 Promotional GlEs with some business activities.
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mandated social welfare activity rather tlhan a transfer to allow an
inefficient GIE to break even.
11. The performance of the GIEs deteriorated sharply in the late 1970
and early 1980s and by 1983 five companies were making losses of W36 billion
(about $45 million) compared to only two companies making losses of W4 billion
in 1980. The remaining GIEs made profits of W484 billion in 1983, so the net
performance of the sector was still positive. Nevertheless, by Korean
standards the GIEs were weak performers; operating profits to business capital
for GIEs was 3.7% compared to 10.1% for industry as a whole.
12. In response the government introduced a sweeping reform program for
GIEs with the following major components:
Mi) Reform of GIE legal status. Prior to 1983 each
enterprise was ruled by a host of laws and regulations:
the GIE Budget and Accounts Act, the GIE
Administration Act, the Board of Audit and Inspection
Act, the Procurement Fund Act, individual company acts
of establishment and a number of other acts and
regulations affecting business supervision. The 1983
GIE Management Act repealed the first two acts and
changed the way GIEs were governed by the other laws.
The 1983 Act increases their autonomy, simplifies
their relations with government, shifts from control of
budgets to assessing management on the achievement of
- 11 -
agreed objectives and standardizes GIE rules and
procedures.3/
(ii) Changes in the Board of Directors. Previously the
boards of GIEs were standing, executive boards. The
new structure clearly separates the policy making
function of boards from the implementation
responsibility of management. The chairmen and
directors of the GIEs used to be permanent
appointments; they are now appointed for a three year
term without pay (except for reimbursement of
expenses). Furthermore Government representation on
the boards is now limited to two directors, one from
the supervisory ministry and one from the Economic
Planning Bureau (EPB) with the other directors coming
from the private sector (businessmen, accountants,
university professors, and the like).
(iii) Managerial autonomy. GIE managers have been given
greater freedom in decisions about budgeting,
personnel, and procurement as follows:
Budgets which used to be prepared according to
government guidelines and then reviewed by the
supervising ministry, the EPB and the Cabinet, are now
3/For more information see Korea, Economic Planning Board, "Introduction
to the New Government-Invested Enterprise Administration System" (August, 1988).
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prepared according to common guidelines from the
Ministry of Economy and require approval only by the
GIE board of directors.
Personnel decisions, which used to be made by the
ministry in many cases, are usually made by the
president of the GIE who frequently promote existing
employees of the firm in order to reward good
performance.
Procurement through the centralized Office of Supply
has became voluntary instead of compulsory.
(iv) Supervision. Previously many agencies could conduct
inspections of the companies: the Korea Electric
Company (KEPCO) underwent eight inspections lasting 108
days in 1981 alone. Policy decisions affecting GIEs
were poorly coordinated and supervision was based on ex
ante controls and detailed budget reviews. Now audits
and inspections are limited to the Board of Audit and
the principal mechanism for supervision has become the
ex post performance evaluation system described below.
A Management Evaluation Council has been created to
coordinate major policy decisions, including: (a)
guidelines for preparing management objectives; (b)
guidelines for budget preparation; and, (c) performance
evaluation. The Council is chaired by the Minister of
the Economic Planning Board and includes the Minister
- 13 -
of Finance, ministers of other supervisory ministries,
and non-standing commissioners with recognized
experience and knowledge.
(v) Managerial strengthening. Previously almost half of
all senior appointments were made from outside the
enterprise and frequently unqualified or inexperienced
persons were chosen. Now preference is given to
internal appointments and often a test or some other
merit assessment is part of the selection process.
Enterprises are developing systems to evaluate
individual performance and assure merit based
promotions. Senior staff work under a three year
contract but can be dismissed for incompetency.
The GIE Performance Evaluation System
13. The performance evaluation system holds management accountable for
achieving agreed objectives which have been calculated as annual targets.
Initially, a number of criteria for assessing performance of each enterprise
was devised by experts from the Korean Development Institute (KDI) working
with government and the GIE staff. Each criterion was assigned a weight to
reflect its priority, and the weighted scores were summed to calculate a
single composite score for the enterprise. The process is as follows:
- 14 -
(i) Indicators of performance are developed by the outside
experts (notably staff of KDI) working with the
Performance Evaluation Division of EPB;
(ii) These are then discussed with the GIE and sometimes
modified;
(iii) At the end of the evaluation period the GIE submits an
annual report on its performance;
(iv) An ad hoc Management Evaluation Task Force composed of
outside experts (from universities, research
institutes, accounting firms and private business)
evaluates the firm on the basis of its report and
supporting documents, as well as visits to the GIE and
interviews with staff;
(v) The Management Evaluation Council deliberates on the
Task Force report and decides on a score; and,
(vi) The score is used to determine the GIE's grade and
hence the annual bonus that its staff will receive. 4i
14. Performance Indicators. The indicators assess management's
performance, not the compax±y's, by evaluating only those things management can
control. For example, if the company makes losses because management
4/For more information on the Korean System see: Young C. Park,
A System for Evaluating the Performance of Government Invested Enterprises in
the Republic of Korea (World Bank Discussion Paper #3, November, 1986). For
details on the theory and design of the performance evaluation system see
Leroy Jones, "Towards a Performance Evaluation Methodology for Public Enterprises
with special reference to Pakistan", (paper presented to a Symposium sponsored
by the Government of Pakistan and the United Nations, Islamabad, November 1981).
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inherited a poor capital stock then management is not penalized, rather if the
losses are reduced through better cost control, then the system would reward
the staff. All financial indicators are put into constant prices (using a
Divisia index) so that managers are not penalized or rewarded because of
changes in prices due to price controls5/. The indicators also try to measure
public rather than private benefits by excluding transfer payments, such as
taxes.
15. Table D of the Appendix shows by way of illustration the indicators
used in 1988 for one company (the National Housing Corporation or NHC). This
example illustrates two notable features of the Korean performance evaluation
system: the excessive number of very different indicators developed for each
GIE (40 in the case of NHC) and the importance given to qualitative indicators
(40% of the NHC score). (Table 2 shows that qualitative indicators were 40 to
50% of the GIE scores in 1987). Although the original design called for a
simpler system with few indicators, practical considerations led to the
present system. One reason for the number and variety of indicators is the
diversity of enterprises being assessed. Unlike a similar system developed in
Pakistan for manufacturing enterprises only, the Korean system is being
applied to manufacturing, financial, marketing, and promotional firms and
performance indicators had to be tailored to the very different characters of
the GIEs. Some of the companies, such as the Agricultural Promotion
Corporation (rural development and export promotion) or the Oversees
5/The Divisia index uses two-year moving averages as weights (as opposed to
Laspeyres, which uses the first year and Paasche which uses the last year).
Table 2
KOREA: BREAKDOWN BETWEEN VUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CRITERIA
(1984 - 1987)
(Percentage Weight)
1984 1965 1986 1967
QUAM QUAL QUAN QUAL WAN QUAL QUAN WQAL
MANES OF GIEs
1. Korea Development Bank 70.0 30.0 56.0 44.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
2. Small and NediL, Industry Bank 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
3. Citizens National Bank 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
4. Korea Housing Bank 70.0 30.0 58.0 42.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
5. Korea Securities Exchange /1 60.0 40.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0
6. Goverfment Mint 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
7. Korea Electric Power Corporation 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 65.0 35.0 60.0 40.0
8. Korea Coal Mining Corporation 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
9. Korea Mining Promotion Corporation 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
10. Petroleum Development Corporation 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 45.0 55.0 50.0 50.0
11. Korea General Chemical Corporation 60.0 40.0 42.0 58.0 45.0 55.0 50.0 50.0
12. Korea Trade Promotion Corporation 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 55.0 45.0 55.0 45.0
13. Korea Highway Corporation 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
14. Korea Housing Corporation 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
15. Industrial Site and Water Resource 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
Development Corporation
16. Korea Land Development Corporation 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
17. Agriculture Promotion Corporation 70.0 30.0 58.0 42.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
18. Agriculture and Fishery Marketing Corp. 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
19. Korea Telecoemunication Authority 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 57.0 43.0 60.0 40.0
20. Korea Tourism Corporation 40.0 60.0 50.0 50.0 55.0 45.0 55.0 45.0
21. Korea Broadcasting System /2 60.0 40.0 55.0 45.0 44.5 55.5
22. National Textbook Company 70.0 30.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0
23. Korea Overseas Development Corporation 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
24. Labor Welfare Corporation 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 55.0 45.0 55.0 45.0
25. Korea Gas Corporation 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 40.0 60.0 50.0 50.0
26. Korea Monopoly Corporation /3 - . . - - 55.0 45.0
Source: Korea Development Institute.
Notes:
/1. Korea Securities Exchange was out of the performance evaluation system
since 1987.
/2. Korea Broadcasting System was out of the performance evaluation system
since 1987.
/3. Korea Monopoly Corporation became a GIE in 1987.
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Development Corporation (assistance to workers to find jobs and transfer
overseas) have never been treated as profit maximizing firms and have proved
very difficult to assess under a system originally designed for productive,
commercially-oriented enterprises. Moreover, some of the GIEs are strongly
influenced by political or social welfare objectives in ways that can prove
hard to quantify in assessing performance (which partly explains why the
Korean Broadcasting System was dropped from the system in 1987).
16. A second reason for the large number of indicators is that the
system aims to evaluate the GIE's performance on all of its objectives, both
short and long term, quantitative and qualitative. This despite the fact that
qualitative indicators are very difficult to evaluate. Third, and perhaps
most important, indicators were added in order to win managerial acceptance
of the system. Managers wanted the criteria disaggregated so they could apply
some of the targets to individual departments or offices and thus better
mobilize staff toward achieving the general goals.
17. Finally, qualitative indicators have been used in part to give more
weight to the outside experts' judgements vis-a-vis management. Most GIEs
have created a Division for Performance Evaluation which is permanently
assigned to monitor achievement of the targets and evaluate results. In
contrast, the experts spend only three weeks on a part-time basis evaluating
the results. Moreover, the information available to the enterprise
necessarily always exceeds that of any outsider. To try to assure that
management could not achieve a high score merely by manipulating the
- 18 -
quantitative results, an important part of the grade was therefore based on
the subjective judgements of the experts.
18. Grading. Generally the C (expected or satisfactory) grade for
quantitative target values is set on the basis of the last three to seven
years' results (using eitiuer a five- to seven-year regression trend or a
three-year Beta weighted distribution) or in some cases a target set in the
enterprise's corporate plan. When the target is based on past trends the
upper and lower grades are bounded by historic standard deviations. In other
words, if the GIE does more or less than what it did in the past it gets a C
grade; if it does better (or worse) by more than can be explained by random
luck it gets a B (or D) grade.61 Since 1986, targets can also be adjusted to
take into account new factors that may have a drastic effect on projected
trends. This has only been done once so far: in 1986 the KEPCO profitability
target was adjusted downward to reflect a major increase in fixed assets with
the addition of a large nuclear power plant.
19. All indicators are weighted and enterprises can receive a total
score of up to 100. Grades and bonuses are assigned on the following basis:
6/Leroy P. Jones, "Notes on Improving Korea's Public Enterprise Evaluation
Effort," (Processed, December, 1985).
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-SCORE gBmOUS
95 - 100 Excellent (A) 300% monthly salary
90 - 94 Good (B) 250 - 290%
85 - 89 Expected (C) 200 - 240%
80 - 84 Poor (D) 159 - 190%
75 - 79 Deteriorating (E) 100 - i40%
*Since 1985 the bonus goes up by 10% for each 1 point increase in
score. (For example, a score of 90 gives a 250% bonus, 91 gives 260%,
etc.)
There is no logic to giving rewards for poor and deteriorating performance.
Very few GIEs have been classified as D (see para. 24) and the existence of
the bonus for D and E grades does not seen to counteract other pressures to
improve performance. Nevertheless, this feature of the system seems ill-
advised.
20. Incentives. Before the performance evaluation system was introduced,
GIE employees received three months salary as a fixed bonus (in fact, it was
treated as part of their salary) and usually two months salary as an incentive
bonus. This incentive was determined on the basis of subjective judgements
rather than any consistent or objective assessment. GIE staff still receive
the three months' fixed bonus, since it is considered a salary supplement, but
they now can also get up to three months incentive on the basis of the
company's score in the performance evaluation system.
- 20 -
21. The incentive bonus is distributed to all staff. Most of the
enterprises have introduced evaluation systems for their departments and
divisions as well as for individual employees. In some cases an outstanding
division or employee may receive a slightly larger bonus then the rest, but
below average performers do not receive less. Nevertheless, the evaluations
of departments and divisions serve the purpose of flagging to the rest of the
company which departments are pulling up or down the performance of the CIE as
a whole, while the assessments of individual performance form the basis for
promotion.
22. The ranking of the GIEs is published in the press and has become the
subject of intense competition, and for top level executives the ranking of
the company is considered as, if not more, important than the bonus. Because
the targets are based on an improvement over past performance, the top ranked
enterprise may not be the most profitable or efficient firm, but rather the
one showing the greatest progress. As a result, all firm have a shot at
being first. Staff of good performing companies tend to believe that it is
harder for them to achieve first place than for poor performers which have
more room for improvement. Staff also complained about the so-called ratchet
effect: each time the GIE improves its score the target becomes tougher even
though the scope for further improvement may be low or nil. The only way to
assess these criticisms would be to compare GIE performance with that of
identical or closely similar enterprises elsewhere and try to judge whether
further major improvements are possible. While such comparisons are difficult
to do, they should receive more attention in the future to assure that goals
- 21 -
are realistic and absolute--as opposed to relative--performance is
satisfactory.
23. Scores of the GIEs. Table E of the Appendix shows the scores and
grades achieved by the enterprises from 1984 to 1987. If the expected level
of the target is the mid point of grade C (87.5), then the average scores have
been consistently about 3 basis points higher. 7 1 The scores have tended to
cluster in the B grade: anywhere from 63% to 86% of the total scores giver..
have been B's.
24. These results appear to indicate that the "expected" or satisfactory
criteria are too soft. On the other hand, no enterprise has ever received an
A grade (while every year one or two receive a D). What has happened is that
most of the GIEs are competing fiercely over a much narrower range of scores -
- between 90 and 94 -- than the 5 grades appears to imply. Since both the
ranking and the bonus depend on these small diffe,rences, the system still has
a strong incentive effect. Most of the GIEs are profitable, reasonably good
performers, and this competition for marginal improvement probably makes sense
in Korea. Moreover, the "ratchet effect" mentioned earlier should make the
grades increasingly harder. In a country where public enterprises are losing
7
'The actual average scores and the difference from the expected score of
87.5 were as follows:
AVERAGE DIFFERENCE
SCORE FROM
EXPECTED 87.5
1984 90.3 2.8
1985 89.7 2.2
1986 91.2 3.7
1987 90.3 2.8
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money or performing well below potential, however, targets based solely on
past performance trends would usually be too lenient. Target setting would
need to take into account international performance norms and benchmark
indicators based on the performance of similar companies in other countries.
Assessment of-the Performance Evaluation System
25. Overall, the financial picture of the GIEs has improved in the period
since the system was introduced (Table 3). Profits net of government
transfers grew by about 10% in real terms from 1983 (the first year of the
reforms) to 1986.8/ The real profits net of transfers of GEs also increased
by 10% from 1983 to 1986. The improvement of GEs profits is related to the
GIE reforms since the transformation of a government enterprise to a
government invested enterprise (or even the prospect of such a change) is a
major force for GE performance improvements.
26. Financial profitability is not very informative about the actual
impact of the performance evaluation system on efficiency, however. Taxes,
depreciation, nonoperating income, price controls, government mandated costs
(to achieve certain social goals for example), all affect profits in ways that
may have no relation to efficiency changes. Financial profitability is not a
8/While most of the transfers consist of operating subsidies, primarily to
the largely non-profit agriculture, mining and tourism promotion companies, part
(about 10% in 1986) is capital transfers.
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TsbLe 3
KOREA: FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF GIEs
(1982 - 1986)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 AVE. ANN.
CHANGE
PROFITS
NLNBER OF GlEs 18 18 22 22 22 5.1X
PROFIT (BIL WON)
- CURRENT 409 484 612 610 794 18.1X
- CONSTANT 409 468 579 563 713 14.9X
LOSSES
NUMBER OF GlEs 6 6 3 3 3 -15.9X
LOSSES (BIL WON)
- CURRENT 49 48 13 14 17 -23.4X
- CONSTANT 49 46 13 13 15 -25.5X
NET PROFIT (BIL WON)
- CURRENT 360 436 599 596 778 21.2X
- CONSYANT 360 422 567 550 698 18.0X
Source: Korea DeveLopment Institute.
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target in the system and, for some of the promotional companies, profit
maximization is not an objective at all.
27. A more meaningful measurement of operational efficiency is public
profitability in constant prices, which is the equivalent of a quantum index
of outputs minus a quantum index of inputs. Public profit is an indicator
that is intended to increase only when society as a whole is better off.
Public profits are standard financial profits adjusted as follows:
Private Profits
+ Taxes
+ Interest
+ Depreciation
- Nonoperating income (financial income and rent, capital gains
and transfers)
- Opportunity cost of working capital
- Public profits
Taxes are added back in since this is a return from government's point of
view; this avoids giving managers a reward for ieducing taxes. Depreciation
is added back in order not to penalize newer plants vis-a-vis older ones or
reward enterprises for underdepreciating or changing their accounting
practices so as to reduce depreciation charges. Interest is added back
because changes in interest payments do not reflect changes in Internal
operating efficiency but transfers from one part of society to another.
Interest does represent the cost of capital to the firm. The system assumes,
- 25 -
however, that (enterprise investment and debt decision are best handled
through separate control systems designed to assure the most efficient
allocation of capital and not through a system designed to assess operating
efficiency.) Nonoperating income is excluded since it does not reflect
operating efficiency. And, finally, a charge is added for the opportunity
cost of working capital (the charge was 10% in 1986). The GIEs are charged
for fixed capital by including fixed operating assets in the denominator, thus
adjusting for changes due to expansion.
28. Public profits are then converted to constant prices using a
Divisia index9/. Since the managers of GIEs cannot change their prices in
most cases, constant-priced profits attempts to measure factors they can
control. The Divisia index uses changing weights, so managers still have an
incentive to seek lower costs or higher profits through prices changes where
they have that option.
29. Some arguments can be raised against public profitability. One is
that by, in effect, ignoring taxes, interest, depreciation and non-operating
income, managers are not motivated to minimize their charges and maximize
their income. While this is an important argument, in fact most public
managers cannot control some of these items (debt and interest rates are often
determined by government, for example). Others are easily manipulated to hide
inefficiencies (depreciation or non-operating income, for instance!. Public
9/See Mary M. Shirley, "Evaluating the Performance of Public Enterprises in
Pakistan" (World Bank, PPR Working Paper 160, March 1989) for an explanation of
this index.
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profitability is not an all inclusive measure and, other indicators, such as
debt: equity, liquidity measures, or financial profitability where
appropriate, can be added to assure that financial solvency is also improved.
30. Despite its drawbacks, the easiest way to assess the impact of the
system on operational efficiency is to evaluate its effect on public
profitability. The public profitability concept was originally designed for
manufacturing firms and is not as easily applied to nornmanufacturing101.
Since most of the GIEs are not in manufacturing, public profitability is
currently used as a target for only five: Korean Power Corporation (KEPCO),
Korea Telecommunication Authority (KTA), Korea Coal Mining Corporation (KCMC),
Government Mint, and National Textbook Company (NTC). (Cost minimization and
similar financial targets are used for most of the other GIEs.) This does not
limit the sample as much as it might appear since these five companies are a
significant part of the GIE group: they represent about one third of the
total GIE assets and 45% of total GIE employment. Moreover, since they are
the sort of firms most likely to be considered for performance evaluation
schemes in other countries, their experience undar performance evaluation is
of particular interest.
31. Graph 4 compares the actual public profitability of the five firms
with their trend in performance (extrapolated from their l.st five years'
performance). The graph shows a dramatic improvement over the trend line in
the period since the performance evaluation system was introduced in 1983.
lo/ See Ieroy Jones, "Towards a Performance Evaluation Methodology for
Public Enterprises..." op. cit.
GRAPH 4
Korea: Public Profitability for 5 GlEs
19 - 18.56
18 1
0 17 -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~79
0
1:
133 13.323.2
13 { 3 , ; # r | z 13.2
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Year
Real o Estimated
- 28 -
This reflects major improvements in the two most important firms - KEPCO and
KTA - which together control almost US$ 32 billion in assets and employ 76
thousand people (compared to US$ 763 million in assets and 18 thousand
employees in the other three).
32. Two of the other firms, KCMC and the Mint, also initi.lly improved
their performance after the system was introduced but experienced a
deterioration in public profitability in 1986 for reasons which have little to
do with efficiency. (See Graphs One through Five of the statistical appendix
to this annex for individual company performance). The Coal Mining
Corporation's cost went up due to deeper mining as veins near the surface were
depleted, labor unrest and higher than usual wage increases1 /. The Mint
experienced a drop in sales because government reduced its demand for paper
money, while expenses grew because the company shifted to a better quality
paper. The Mint began to export in 1985/86 which should make it less
vulnerable to government buying decisions. Finally, the fifth firm, NTC, is a
small company (less than 500 employees) which was adversely affected by
government's decision in 1985 to allow students to buy used textbooks.
33. The two critical questions are: (i) are the improvements in the
manufacturing companies representative of the other GIEs and, (ii) were the
GIE reforms and, in particular, the performance evaluation system, the reason
for the improvements. On the first question there is no single measure of
11/To calculate public profits in constant prices labor costs are deflated
using the government approved wage increase to discourage above norm wage
increases.
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efficiency that can be applied to the other GIEs, but, as mentioned, all of
the entcrprises face some sort of cost minimization/revenue nhancement
target. A study comparing the ratio of cost of sales to total revenues in
constant prices found that the cost ratio was below expectations (based on
past averages and trends) in the three years after the system was introduced
(see Table 4). In 1986, for example, costs were 67.7% of revenues for all the
GIEs versus an expected ratio of 73.1% based on past performance. This
indicator has less meaning for some of the enterprises (such as the financial
enterprises) than for others. Neverthelese. the consistency of the
improvement in the different sectors is striking. Furthermore, the evidence
of efficiency improvement is borne out by the performance of the enterprises
on their individual efficiency targets. Even though the initial level of the
targets based on past performance may have been soft, as mentioned above, the
targets have become progressively harder as the enterprises have been required
to better their past improvements. Despite this most of the GIEs are still
earning a B grade.
34. The second question--whether these efficiency gains can be
attributed to the reforms--cannot be systematically tested since there are few
comparable enterprises outside the system.12/ There are factors other than
managerial changes that could explain some of the efficiency gains. The year
after the introduction of the system was a period of economy-wide recovery,
which probably explains some of the initial buoyancy of the five sample
enterprises, although not their sustained efficiency improvements.
12/ A similar assessment in Pakistan also found that the incompatibility
of data between public and private enterprises prevented comparison.
.30P_
TABLE 4
KOREA: COMPARISON OF ESTIMATED TO ACTUAL RATIO OF
COST OF SALES TO TOTAL REVENUE 1/
Average
1981 - 83 1984 1985 1986
1. FinanciaL PEs
ActuaL Ratio 82.0 80.5 76.8 76.9
Estimated Ratio - 82.3 83.1 84.0
Differences 1.8 6.3 7.1
2. Construction GIEs
Actual Ratio 81.2 80.3 76.2 76.3
Estimted Ratio - 81.7 82.0 82.6
Differences - 1.4 5.8 6.3
3. Manufacturing GlEs
Actual Ratio 79.3 93.4 79.0 74.5
Estimated Ratio - 77.7 81.1 79.0
Differences - 4.3 2.1 4.5
4. Service BIEs
Actual Ratio 65.1 54.1 59.9 64.7
Estimated Ratio - 70.1 70.0 70.3
Differences - 16.0 10.8 5.6
5. Energy and
Coamunicatiors GIEs
Actual Ratio 73.1 68.2 67.0 62.0
Estimated Ratio - 70.9 69.4 66.5
Differences - 2.7 2.4 4.5
6. ALl GIEs
Actual Ratio 75.9 71.7 70.2 67.7
Estimated Ratio - 74.7 74.3 73.1
Differences 3.0 4.1 5.4
Source: Song, Dae Hee, lCorea Public Enterprise Performance
Evaluation System (Korea Development Institute,
Noverber 1988, Processed).
1/. Estimates based on projected trends using linear regressions
for ten older GlEs and average of 1981-83 for all others.
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Enterprises such as KEPCO and KTA were also expanding throughout this period,
however, both KEPCO and KTA show improvements in efficiency indicators (a drop
in transmission losses in KEPCO and in the failure rate of local and long
distance calls for KTA) not positively affected by expansion. Furthermore,
there is qualitative evidence that part of the improvements can be attributed
to the reforms.
35. First, the reforms have had a distinct impact on the way the GIEs
do business. Government intervention has been sharply curbed; managerial
appointments are made from within the enterprise; and pezformance evaluation
plays an important role in the GIE's own assessment of its plans and
personnel. Most GIE s have created an office for performance evaluation to
develop objectives, negotiate targets, monitor achievement and write
evaluations of the results. Since the evaluation has internal as well as
external significance, this office has become an important part of the
enterprise's operations and recently several executive directors have been
appointed from the performance evaluation office. Many GIEs consulted had
developed detailed targets for departments, divisions and offices based on the
performance evaluation targets. KTA, for example, has an evaluation system to
check on the performance of its twelve branch offices which compete among
themselves for a good score. Promotions take into account the results of
these internal evaluations. KEPCO does the same for its 290 branch offices,
which also receive awards, such as medals or ribbons, based on their
performance.
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36. Second, opinions of those affected strongly favor the reforms.
The managers and government officials consulted five years after the system
was introduced, agreed that the reforms had a positive effect on
performance13 l. Furthermore, a 1987 opinion survey of 750 employees in all
ranks of the GIEs 1987 shows that this positive view of the reforms is
widespread. Ninety three percent of those consulted felt that there had been
an improvement in management of the enterprise since the introduction of the
reforms, about 55% saw a substantial improvement. Interestingly the
confidence in the improvements increases with rank. About 94% of the
executive directors surveyed saw substantial or significant improvements in
management, versus 55% of the rank and file. (An additional 33% of the rank
and file saw modest improvements, so a total of 88% were favorable).141
Annlying the Reforms in Other Countries
37. Countries interested in applying a system like that of Korea would
want to know: (i) whether there are features of the Korea system that make it
hard or impossible to replicate; (ii) what are the prerequisites for a
successful performance evaluation system; and, (iii) how should the system be
adapted to circumstances in other countries.
13/ The GIEs consulted were: NHC, KEPCO, KTA, KMC and Small and Medium
Industry Bank; the agencies were: KDI, EPB, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Communications.
U1/Song, Dae Hee, oR.cit.
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38. Features of Korean System, The question of the uniqueness of the
Korean case arises in part because some observers attribute Korea's economic
success to aspects of culture and history that cannot be replicated elsewhere.
This overlooks the fact that two decades ago Korea was not considered to have
a particularly strong economy. Furthermore, a similar system is working well
in Pakistan, a very different economy and culture. The Korean and Pakistani
performance evaluation systems are based on systems used by large private
conglomerates to judge the performance of their subsidiaries which have been
adapted for use with state enterprises in developing countries. As such they
are a transferable technology that can be altered and adapted to fit local
needs.
39. This adaptation can be seen in the case of unionized labor. In
Korea until recently labor unions were weak and strikes unknown. This made it
easier to tie the incentive bonus to the performance of the company. In
Pakistan, on the other hand, the unions are very powerful and opposed the
bonus system. There the system is only applied to nonunionized staff whicn
includes most white collar workers (unionized labor receive a bonus based only
on traditional profits). Although this has weakened the incentive somewhat,
it still has a positive impact because the managerial and white collar staff
have an important influence on the workings of the entire firm.
40. There is no doubt that the economic environment in Korea favors
the success of performance evaluation. Some of the GIEs face domestic
competition and some export; moreover the vibrant private sector offers a
role model and a contrast for the state enterprises. Pakistan has an
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increasingly dynamic private sector and has begun to focus more on export and
to remove barriers to competition with its state enterprises (the state
monopoly on cement production was removed, for example). Yet performance
evaluation can also work where competition is weak or nonexistent, in fact, it
is especially useful where there are market failures. The targeting and
assessment act as a market proxy, holding the erterprise to standards it might
not strive for in a captive market.
41. Prereguisites for Success Successful performance evaluation
depends on: (i) reforms in supervision and management; (ii) reliable and
timely information; (iii) adequate skills to supervise and evaluate; and (iv)
political will.
42. On the first prerequisite, the Korean performance evaluation
system has been successful because it was accompanied by increases in
managerial autonomy and improvements in the calibre of management. Changes
in the budget process, depolitization of the selection of managers and boards,
and reduction of ministerial oversight, were all a part of the reforms and the
efficiency gains cannot be attributed to any one change alone. Petformance
evaluation only sets the targets and motivates management to achieve them.
The other reforms assure that managers have the flexibility and the skills
required to turn motivation into accomplishment. The situation is similar in
Pakistan where ad hoc government intervention has been curbed and managerial
selection and promotion is influenced by the results of the evaluation.
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43. Second, most of the inormation required for performance
evaluation is the same as that required to run any enterprise well, public or
private. It relies principally on the audited accounts of the firm. The
difficulties arise because government must clarify what is expected of the
enterprises, in order to assign weights to the targets, and must account for
any noncommercial objectives set for the firm. Not all noncommercial
objectives have to be quantified, however, only those which affect the
achievement of the targets. Take the case where the enterprise has been put
in a remote iocation to promote regional development. If that company is
judged on the basis of trends in profitability, there would be no need to
calculate the additional costs due to its location since that reduces the
absolute level of profits but does not affect the trend. Of course, ideally
one should calculate this cost and eliminate it since it has a detrimental
affect on economic efficiency. Performance evaluation is a second best
solution, telling managers to maximize operating efficiency within the
constraints they are given.
44. The information demands of the system increase if the indicators
are put in constant prices, since that should be done with individual price
deflators for each enterprise's main output and input prices, rather than with
a general price index. Yet this information should also be easily available
(a firm should know the price and quantity of the major items it buys and
sells). The complexity arises when assigning proper weights for diversified
product lines. There are two reasons to use constant prices: to account for
the distortions caused by market failures and price controls and to develop a
quantum index that measures efficiency gains apart from financial changes.
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Other physical indicators could be used instead to simplify matters, although
tk3se indicators are partial and can distort firm behavior.15/
45. Skills are required to set up the system, negotiate and monitor
the targets and evaluate and grade performance. Korea used a consultant (the
same consultant as Pakistan) and the KDI staff to set up the system. The
system is now easier to install since new users can benefit from the learning
that has taken place and assistance is available from consultants and the
countries that have implemented it. The negotiation and monitoring should be
done by a government agency; in most countries one or more such agencies are
already supervising state enterprise performance. For this agency to do more
systematic evaluations may require additionnl skills. In Pakistan, where
civil service salaries made it difficult to attract adequate skills, the
monitoring agency (the Expert Advisory Cell) is not part of the civil service
and is funded by a levy on the enterprises. This has enabled the Cell to
attract experts able, not only to monitor the enterprise, but also to do the
evaluation. The Koreans have used ad hoc groups of experts from universities
and business to help the Government staff evaluate the GIEs.
46. Political will is required to introduce the reforms in the face of
possible opposition from complacent managers, entrenched bureaucrats,
interested politicians and comfortable workers. Performance evaluation is not
a threat to good managers. To the contrary, they welcome the chance to
separate managerial performance from the costs and constraints imposed by
15/For more on the choice of performance indicators see Leroy Jones, oo...
cit.
- 37 -
government. The bureaucracy may be unwilling to yield its power to intervene
at whim, and politicians may not wish to see the merit system replace the
spoils system in enterprise appointments. Government also finds it difficult
to clarify objectives and treat enterprises in a commercial and transparent
fashion. Workers may oppose the system if they fear that efficiency will lead
to layoffs, lower wage increases and stricter personnel policies. If in the
past state enterprises were run with redundant labor; wage increases were well
above productivity gains; and discipline was lax; then such fears are probably
justified. Even though the system can still function without worker
participation (as in Pakistan), it works much better where labor is included.
This means convincing workers that they will be better off in the long run in
an efficiently run enterprise than in one where personnel policies are slack.
47. Adanting the System. The performance evaluation system is
designed for firms producing goods and services for sale in the market and is
much easier to apply to them. Other countries may choose not to apply the
system to the sort of nonprofit and regulatory entities being evaluated in
Korea. Since the large productive firms, especially the utilities and
transport monopolies, are typically the most important of the state
enterprises it makes sense to begin with them.
48. The Koreans introduced an excessive number of performance
indicators for pragmatic reasons, but in most countries the number of
indicators should be much fewer. While there is something to be said for
having targets that can be equated to internal, departmental or divisional
achievements, this very much compl.cates the weighting and evaluation process
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and endangers managerial autonomy. The system is meant to signal management
is to what government considers desirable behavior and to allow government to
control enterprises on the basis of results, not their conformity to
bureaucratic processes. The targets should therefore aim to' give a clear
indication of government's objectives and priorities. In cases where GIEs
have targets with weights of less than one percent, the signal from government
is far from clear. In addition qualitative indicators should be used
sparingly: they further confuse the signals to management and are hard to
evaluate.
49. With so m.ny targets, some will duplicate others, which can have
perverse effects on behavior. For example, an indicator such as
profitability counts every cost once and every benefit once. If it is
combined with, for example, a target to reduce raw material costs, then such
costs are counted twice. An enterprise has a better chance of making a high
grade if it focuses on reducing raw material costs even at the expense of
higher administrative costs or greater revenues. In this case net benefits
(efficiency, in other words) will not improve and may even decline. An
alternative is to have fewer, nonduplicative targets at the level of the
enterprise, and to encourage the firm to disaggregrate these into targets for
its various departments or offices through a separate, internal evaluation.
50. Other countries will also want to eliminate rewards for poor
performance and use criteria that result in clearer grade differences. The
in-grade competiti.'n peculiar to Korea is unlikely to transplant successfully.
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51. As mentioned, performance evaluation can act as a market proxy; it
can create pressures for efficiency that in other circumstances might be
supplied by the market. But administrative arrangements prove a weak
substitute for competitive pressures. Competition should be used to promote
efficiency wherever possible through trade liberalization, removal of barriers
to private entry, ending discrimination between public and private enterprise,
promotion of exports, etc. This will greatly simplify the task of evaluating
competitive enterprises, which can be held to a simple profit target, and
allow the system to focus on the natural monopolies.
52. Finally, performance evaluation is designed to promote operational
efficiency; allocative efficiency is not assured. In other words, it aims to
assure that state enterprises make the best use of their assets; it cannot
determine whether the investment in the enterprise represents the best use of
resources. Some state enterprises tie up resources in activities with low, or
even negative, economic returns that could be put to far more productive uses
elsewhere. In some extreme cases improving an enterprise's operations may
make matters worse: society is worse off economically the more the enterprise
produces because the economic value of its output is less than the economic
value of the inputs its consumes. Thus, performance evaluation is no
substitute for an assessment of the economic and financial viability of the
enterprise and the costs and benefits of new investments.
Appendix
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TABLE A
KOREA: IMPORTANCE OF PE SECTOR
1982 - 1986
GWP SHARE (X)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
GE 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8
GIE 4.4 4.8 5.5 6.1 6.1
SCGIE 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2
GBE 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3
TOTAL 8.8 9.0 9.8 10.4 10.4
EMPLOYNENT SHARE (X)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
GE 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
GIE 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
SCGIE N/A N/A 0.3 0.3 0.3
GBE 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
/1 /1
TOTAL 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9
SHARE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION (X)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
GE 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
GIE 41.2 17.2 15.7 14.5 12.7
SCGIE N/A N/A 2.5 N/A 0.8
GBE 5.0 0.8 1.6 3.0 1.2
/1 /I /1
TOTAL 47.6 19.0 20.7 18.4 15.6
Source: Korea Development Inatitute (KDI)
Note: /1. Excluding SCGIEs.
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Tabte B
KOREA: PE AND SECTORAL GDP SHARE
(1975 - 1986)
(Unit: X)
PE VALUE ADDED BY SECTOR
1975 1980 1984 1986
Agri. forestry & fishery 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.00
Mining & quarrying 2.50 0.80 2.30 2.50
Manufacturing 46.60 37.60 31.20 15.80
Electricity, gas & iater 12.10 19.50 24.90 31.10
Construction 3.30 4.60 4.10 5.90
Whole sale & retail 1.90 1.30 0.10 0.10
Trans., storage & corn. 13.10 15.60 26.20 28.90
Financing, insurance, real estate & business service 19.20 19.10 7.00 11.20
Community, social & personal service 1.20 1.20 4.10 4.50
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
PE SHARE OF TOTAL SECTOR VALUE ADDED
1975 1980 1984 1986
Agri. forestry & fishery 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.00
Mining & quarrying 12.00 5.00 16.10 17.20
Manufacturing 16.60 15.50 10.50 4.80
Electricity, gas & water 83.00 96.90 86.30 89.20
Construction 0.50 5.30 4.80 6.80
Wholesale & retail 0.80 0.80 0.03 0.01
Trans., storage & comm. 16.90 21.00 30.30 32.60
Financing, insurance, real estate & business service 56.20 30.40 7.00 9.50
Community, social & personal service 0.70 10.40 9.70 10.40
TOTAL (PE/GDP) 8.30 10.40 9.70 10.40
Sources: Korea Development Institute & Bank of Korea.
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Table C
KOREA: LIST OF PEs BY ORDER OF ASSET SIZE
(1986)
ASSET EMPLOYEES SUPERVISING
MINISTRIES/i
BIL WON X OF TOT. # X OF TOT.
GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE (GE)
OFFICE OF RAILUAYS 3,298 3.34 28,653 9.72 NOT
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION 2,908 2.95 34,063 11.56 MOCH
OFFICE OF MONOPOLY /2 2,245 2.27 11,500 3.90 MOF
OFFICE OF SUPPLY 54 0.06 1,143 0.39 MOF
OFFICE OF GRAIN MANAGEMENT 1 0.00 1,160 0.39 MOAF
SUB-TOTAL 8,507 8.62 76,519 25.96
NIL USS 10,736.9
GOVERNMENT INVESTED ENTERPRISE (GIE)
KOREA (K.) DEVELOPMENT BANK 15,342 15.55 1,960 0.66 MOF
K. ELECTRIC POWER CORP. 12,570 12.74 25,215 8.56 MOER
K. TELECOM. AUTHORITY 5,594 5.67 51,432 17.45 NOCN
CITIZENS NATIONAL BANK 5,355 5.43 11,212 3.80 MOF
SMALL & MEDIUM INDUSTRY BANK 5,051 5.12 7,849 2.66 NOF
K. HOUSING BANK 3,440 3.49 7,824 2.65 MOF
K. HOUSING CORP. 2,340 2.37 2,506 0.85 MOCN
IND.SITE&WATER ESOURCE DEV. 1,582 1.60 1,687 0.57 MOCN
K. LAND DEVELOP. CORP. 1,290 1.31 1,213 0.41 MOCN
AGRI. PROMOTION CORP. 762 0.77 1,855 0.63 MOAF
K. GAS CORP. 480 0.49 658 0.22 MOER
K. HIGHUAY CORP. 463 0.47 2,718 0.92 MOCN
K. COAL CORP. 459 0.47 14,569 4.94 MOER
K. BROADCASTING SYSTEM 335 0.34 5,193 1.76 NOCI
AGRI. & FISHERY MKTG CORP. 203 0.21 652 0.22 MOAF
K. TOURISt CORP. 124 0.13 638 0.22 NOT
GOVERNMENT MINT 120 0.12 2,748 0.93 MOF
K. MINING PROMOTION CORP. 118 0.12 462 0.16 M0ER
K.INTEGRATED CHEM. STOCK CON. 104 0.11 46 0.02 MOC
PETROLEUM DEVELOPsYENT CORP. 101 0.10 428 0.15 NOER
LABOR WELFARE CORP. 67 0.07 1,425 0.48 MOL
K. SECURITIES EXCRANGE 29 0.03 344 0.12 MOF
NATIONAL TEXTBOOK CON. 25 0.03 487 0.17 MOE
K. TRADE PROMOTION CORP. 11 0.01 567 0.19 M0C
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT CORP. 4 0.00 197 0.07 MOL
SUB TOTAL 55,970 56.71 143,885 48.82
NIL USS 70,642.0
Cont...
lotes:
MOf: Ministry of Finance MOE: Ministry of Education
MOAF: Ministry of Agriculture & Fishery MOC: Ministry of Commerce & Industry
NOER: Ministry of Energy & Resource M0CN: Ministry of Construction
NOT: Ministry of Transportation NMCI: Ministry of Culture & Information
MOCK: Ninistry of Communication NOL: Ministry of Labor
MOST: Ministry of Science & Technology
2/ Office of Monopoty became Korea Monopoly Corporation (GIE) IN 1987.
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Table C
KOREA: LIST Of PEs BY ORDER OF ASSET SIZE(1986)
ASSET EMPLOYEES SUPERVISING
HINISTRIES/i
No. BIL UON X OF TOT. # OF TOT.
SUBSIDIARY OF GOVERNNENT I VESTED ENTERPRISE (SCGIE)
1 DAE-UOO SHIPWJILDING 1,706 1.73 17,148 5.82 HOf
K.HEAVY INDUSTRY 726 0.74 6,308 2.14 MOf
K. INDUSTRIAL EASE 471 0.48 140 0.05 MOF
4 K. SECURITIES FINACING 449 0.45 272 0.09 MOF
5 HAN-EUI MERCHANT BANKING 372 0.38 111 0.04 HOF
6 SAE-KAN MERCHANT BANKING 334 0.34 127 0.04 MOf
7 DAE HAN INVEST. TRUST 229 0.23 1,128 0.38 HOF
8 K. MININGAREFINING 228 0.23 1,377 0.47 HOF
9 HYO-SUNG HEAVY INDUSTRY 228 0.23 3,526 1.20 MOF
0 KOOK-MIN LEASING 216 0.22 80 0.03 MOF
1 NAN HAE CHEMICAL 197 0.20 1.045 0.35 MOC
- K. READJUSTMENT 179 0.18 400 0.14 MOf
K. COLD STORAGE 109 0.11 349 0.12 NOAF
K. FERTILIZER 98 0.10 676 0.23 MOf
BOO-KUK MUTUAL SAVINGS 86 0.09 231 0.08 MOF
K. ENTERPRISE L ASE 81 0.08 61 0.02 MOF
7 MAE-IL DAIRY INDUSTRY 59 0.06 1,010 0.34 MOAF
8 DAE-KOO FIRST MUTUAL SAVINGS 52 0.05 76 0.03 MOF
9 K. DRILLING 49 0.05 33 0.01 MOER
0 YUNG-NAM CHEMICAL 48 0.05 634 0.22 HOC
1 BU-SAN KOOK-MIN MUTUAL SAV. 47 0.05 65 0.02 MOF
9 K. TECHNICAL FINANCING 46 0.05 40 0.01 MOF
WON JIN RAYON 45 0.05 1,613 0.55 MOF
_ KOOK-MIN MUTUAL SAVINGS 42 0.04 60 0.02 MOF
5 HAN-SUNG MUTUAL SAVINGS 38 0.04 62 0.02 HOF
6 YOUNG-NUM MUTUAL SAVINGS 38 0.04 61 0.02 MOF
7 JU-EUN MUTUAL SAVINGS 38 0.04 39 0.01 MOF
a DONG-BOO OIL 31 0.03 232 0.08 MOF
KYUNG-JU TOURISM 29 0.03 60 0.02 HOT
K. NUCLEAR NERGY 22 0.02 161 0.05 MOER
1 DATA COMMUNICATION C RP OF K. 19 0.02 782 0.27 NOOM
2 K. ELECTRIC TECH. 18 0.02 1,155 0.39 HOER
' JUN-NAMM UTUAL SAVINGS 17 0.02 44 0.01 MOF
CHE-JU TOURISM 17 0.02 43 3.01 HOT
5 JIN-HAE CHEMICAL 16 0.02 380 0.13 HOC
I K. ELECTRIC REPAIRMENT 15 0.01 2,583 0.88 NOER
7 K. TELEPHONE DIRECTORY 13 0.01 113 0.04 NO
o HAN KUK TRADING 12 0.01 34 0.01 40F
K. GENERAL TECH. DEV. 7 0.01 819 0.28 MOF
SEOUL-AK TOURISM 7 0.01 141 0.05 HOT
1 KOOK-MIN TECH FIN. 6 0.01 28 0.01 MOF
42 K. ENTERPRISE D V. FIN. 6 0.01 27 0.01 MOF
43 K. SECRUTITIES ETTLEMENT 6 0.01 220 0.07 HOF
U NAEJANG-SAN TOURISM 5 0.01 101 0.03 HOT
45 K. TELECOM. PROMOTION 5 0.00 45 0.02 NOOM
46 K. SECUTITIES COMPUTING 4 0.00 151 0.05 MOF
L7 KBS ENTERPRISE 4 0.00 136 0.05 H0CI
A KUMO-SAN TORISM 3 0.00 73 0.02 HOT
,7 K. TOURIST SERVICE 3 0.00 195 0.07 HOT
0 K. TELECOM. TECH. 2 0.00 59 0.02 MOOM
1 K. OIL PIPELINE 2 0.00 41 0.01 HOER
2 K. ANGEMENT CONSULTING 1 0.00 54 0.02 MOF
3 K. MOVING TELECOM. SERVICE 1 0.00 70 0.02 NMOO
4 K. HARBOR TELEPHONE 0 0.00 4 0.00 14MO
SUB-TOTAL 6,482 6.57 44,423 15.07
NIL USS 8,180.7
Cont. . .
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TabLe C
KOREA: LIST OF PEs BY ORDER OF ASSET SIZE
(1986)
ASSET EMPLOYEES SUPERVISING
_INISTRIES/i
No. BIL WON X OF TOT. # XOF TOT.
GOVERNMENT BACKED ENTERPRISE (GBE)
1 K. EXCHANGE BANK 19,217 19.47 7,460 2.53 HOF
PO-HANG IRON&STEEL 46480 4.54 18,926 6.42 mDC
EX-IN BANK 3,954 4.01 463 0.16 HOF
4 K. TUNGSTEN MINING 53 0.05 1.989 0.67 NOF
5 K. APPRAISAL BOARD 20 0.02 983 0.33 MOF
6 K. TECH. DEV. 7 0.01 91 0.03 MOST
SUB-TOTAL 27,730 28.10 29.912 10.15
NIL USS 34,999.8
GrAND TOTAL 98,688 100.00 294,739 100.00
Source: Korea Development Institute.
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TABLE D (cont'd) Appendix
88 Performance EvaLuation Criteria
Korea National Housing Corporation
I Index Evaluation Criteria I Evaluation Method Ueight(X) I
1. General Indicators i (20)
I . I
I (1) Administration of Operating Operating Expenses * f ( Sales ) o7 Year Trend Value (15)
I Expenses to Sales 0 0
I (2) General Manaement Effitciency 5 Grade Evaluation (S)
I o Efforts for Responsible lanaseuent 3 0
a end Enhancing PubLic Wetf: I a I
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
. I 
I O o Reasonableness of Wage Management 1 2 l
2. Criteria for Carrying Out 0 0(41)
I EstabLishent Purpomm I
I~~ ~~ * I! (1) Construction of Putiblic Housing o (23)
I o Housing Construction Units For Sale : 15.000 Units 0 Target vs.Perforbance I I
I O For Rent: 25.000 Units 2 Z
I~~ ~~~~~~ I I
I o Total Floor Area of Housing Tarset: 2.430.000 n2 3 I
I Construction
I o Rental Housing Construction Cost I
I o Cost Administration of RentaL ------------------------------------ 6 Year Trend Value 1 7
I Housing Constructlon Rental Housing Construction Area .
I . I I
I o Ratio of Investment to Rental  Rental Housing f (Total Assets ) 5 Year Trend Value 4
I Housing Construction o
I o land Procurement Administratlon 5 Grade Evaluation 2 I
I I I
I o Iwroveeent of Housing 4
I Construction I
I (2) Supply of PubLic Housing (13) I
I I I
I o Housing Supply Un;ts For Sale 16.590 Units I Target vs.Perforxance 1 1
I O For Rent 20.670 Units l
Housing Units Sold Out o
I a Administration f Housing Sales i -------------------------- Target Assignuent 5
I I Housing Units for Sales - I
I o 
.
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I. I
o Housing Prices Stabilization Total Housing Sales Price * 7 Year Trend Value 6
I Effects 0 f ( Total Floor Area for Sales)
-
- - --
…-…_¢ _ _ 
_ 
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TABLE D (cout'd)
I Index t Evaluation Criteria Evaluation Method I Welsht(s) I
---------
I (3) Housing Maintenance Administration (5)
I o Housing Maintenance Assisnunt 5 Grade Evaluation: 3
I a t a 
o Numbers of Housing Manageent I Target: 38.400 Units 0 Tarset vs.Perforeance I 2
I Right's Turnover to the Occupants I II
I etc. * 
13. Business Administration Criteria t (39)
I (1) Efficienry Evaluation I13)
I o Administrative Expenses I The Rising Ratio of Administrative Tarset Assignment 1 5
I Expenses I I
I o Admin!stration f Labour Cost I Labour Cost a f ( Administrative Assets 1 7 Year Trend Value t 5
I I + Costs of Sales )
I o Efficiency of Fund Administration I Interest Received a f ( Monetary Assets ) I 7 Year Trend Value 1 3
I (2) Long-Term Business Administration I S Grade Evaluation ( 5)
I a o Manasement Plan Nodification Considering I I I
I I Changing Business Environments 0 0 I
It~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| I o The Efforts to Operate Long-Tere Plan I 2
I o Connection with Short-Term Plan I
' and Sectoral Management Plan 0 0
I:I o The Reasonableness of Planning I
| and Execution for Investment
I (3) Improvement i Administration 1 a 5 Grade Fvaluation 1 (10)
I System 1 o The Efficient Operation of the Board I 1
I of Directors
|o The Reasonableness of Personnel I 2 I
I Admlnistration a d Organization Control 0 1 i
! :0o Reasonableness of Wage System 2
I I o Efficiency of Oudget System I 1 3
I o Efficiency of MIS I
I I o lmprovement onEnergy Administration I- 0 1 I
System
_. . . .... __ ...... ......... .......... ............................... - ................. .. .... .. .........--- .- -------------
Appendix
-47 -
TABLE D (cont'd)
Index t Evaluation Criteria Evaluation Method O Weight(X)
------- ---- --- ---- t -- t -------------- ------------- ------------ - --- -
(4) SubstantaLity In Internal OS Grade EvaLuation (3)
Evaluation It
o Reasonableness of Setting UpInternal I |
Evaluation Index O
I~~ ~ ~~ I I
o Appropriateness of Heasureeent M thod I
O and APplication
I o Feedback and APPlication by Perforrance I
I O Evaluation
I (5) Service Tmprovement 1 5 Grade Evaluation (4)
I I o Efforts for Erhancing the guality of
1 Service to Execute Establishment Purpose
I~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~ .
I O o Efforts for Development of New Service 1
I : According to the Changing Oemand Style O O
I o Efficieny of Management on Civil I I
O Service
I o Efforts for Customers-Oriented Service 1 O
I I O i
I (6) RO I 5 Grade Evaluation (4)
i ai Efforts for R 8 0 2
I O o Aplilcation ot New hateriaLs for
I Construction and Moderateness of
| Haterials Test 0
I Oon-Ouantitative I o Efforts for Enhancing Productivity --- I
I 6uantitative 40 1
|Non-Ouantitative O60
I Total o 100 I
2UUUz.u:::3.:::33u::3:z::::::::::::::::::2 ::::::::: :::::::::: …::: ::::::.:::::: 33 3:::: :::: 2
Table E
Perforaance Score and Grade of 25 GlEs
(1984 - 1987)
1984 1965 1986 19J7
Names of GlEs
Score Grade Score Crade Score Grade Score Grade
1. Korea Development Bank 91.58 a 89.01 C 90.46 B 89.26 C
2. Smatl and Mediu Industry Bank 91.59 B 90.11 B 90.87 B 92.33 a
3. Citizens National Bank 90.22 B. 91.57 B 90.93 B 91.50 B
4. Korea Housing Bank 92.31 B 86.02 C 92.85 8 90.91 a
5. Korea Securities Exchange 92.15 B 88.23 C 89.15 C -
6. Goverrment Mint 90.28 B 90.25 e 93.56 B 87.25 C
7. Korea Electric Power Corporation 90.92 B 90.12 8 93.95 a 92.27 a
8. Korea Coat Mining Corporation 91.15 B 90.13 8 91.11 B 87.54 C
9. Korea Mining Promotion Corporation 90.47 B 90.06 B 90.65 B 91.29 3
10. Petroteum Development Corporation 92.48 B 88.66 C 90.99 B 89.84 C
11. Korea General Chemical Corporation 93.55 B 91.31 B 90.94 B 91.34 a
12. Korea Trade Promotion Corporation 89.60 C 92.53 B 94.36 a 94.48 8
13. Korea Highway Corporation 91.24 B 90.40 B 89.77 C 90.20 8
14. Korea Housing Corporation 83.55 D 90.30 B 93.53 B 94.63 Bc
15. Inidustrial Site and Water Resource 90.74 B 92.56 B 91.36 B 93.38 B
Development Corporation
16. Korea Land Development Corporation 94.35 B 93.00 B 84.14 D a8.28 C
17. Agriculture Promotion Corporation 90.94 B 92.09 B 92.97 B 92.34 a
18. Agriculture and Fishery Marketing Corp. 88.78 C 86.92 C 91.37 B 90.06 8
19. Korea Teleccommication Authority 91.20 B 90.97 B 94.43 a 91.84 B
20. Korea Tourism Corporation 89.13 C 89.14 C 92.7 B 89.63 C
21. Korea Broadcasting System 90.44 B 88.07 C 90.12 a -
22. National Textbook Conpany 89.67 C 89.77 C 88.06 C 87.12 C
23 Korea Overseas Development Corporation 85.37 C 86.17 C 91.09 B 84.01 r
24. Labor Welfare Corporation 92.72 B 91.58 B 90.28 B 86.27 C
25. Korea Gas Corporation 82.13 D 82.94 D 89.78 C 91.98 B
rt
Average 90.26 B 89.68 B/C 91.18 B 90.34 3
Source: Korea Development Institute.
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